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Asset Securitization and Bank risk: Do Religiosity or Ownership Structure Matter? 
 
Abstract 
 
 
We test the impact of religiosity and ownership structure on the risk profile of banks, which issued 
securitisation. We employ GMM estimation using unique database on asset securitization of 672 
commercial banks (4889 year-observations) in 22 countries (from 2003-2012), which have dual banking 
system. We find that banks with higher securitisation activity have consistently shown a riskier profile by 
being significantly less adequately capitalised and offering higher ratio of net loans to total assets.  
Controlling for bank type (Islamic and conventional banks), we find that although Islamic banks, in 
general, show a conservative approach towards risk by keeping higher reserves and more liquidity, banks 
involved in new issuance of asset securitization  as still exposed to a higher risk profile .  Controlling for a 
country religiosity shows different risk profile of banks in countries with different religiosity thresholds. 
Controlling for different types of bank ownership highlights an additional exposure to credit risk in 
addition to capital adequacy and liquidity risks. Our results emphasize the importance of identifying the 
impact of bank type and the religiosity / culture factors in global banking studies.   Our results are of 
importance to both local and international regulators as well as different stakeholders in banks. 
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1. Introduction: 
Over the last two decades and until the financial crisis of 2008, securitization2 has gained momentum 
reaching volumes of $10.24 trillion in the United States and $2.25 trillion in Europe as of the 2nd quarter 
of 2008. Prior literature has indicated multiple benefits of securitization for both issuers and investors, 
such as lower capital requirements, efficient transfer of risks, improved performance, liquidity and credit 
ratings (Alkhan, 2006; Jobst, 2007; AbdulAziz and Gintzburger, 2009; Nadauld and Weisbach, 2012; 
Lemmon et al. 2014). However, prior literature has also indicated negative effects such as reduced 
incentives to appropriately screen borrowers (Loutskina and Strahan, 2009; Keys et al. 2010), incentives 
to securitize low quality assets (Downing, Jaffee, and Wallace, 2009), and increased impediments to 
renegotiating distress loans (Piskorski, Seru, and Vig, 2010). Additionally, critics suggest that the inherent 
complexity and limited monitoring ability of this method lead to a major decline in underwriting 
standards which brought about the severe subprime crisis, the beginning of a bitter financial crisis (Kiff 
and Kisser, 2014). Since then, there has been much questioning of the effectiveness of such innovative 
tools on several dimensions (Wilson, 2009). Therefore, it became a crucial contemporary issue in the 
research of financial institutions and markets to foster the understanding of banks’ securitization activities 
and their impact on bank risk, identifying financial system implications.  
Major international conventional banks have been weakened by the 2008 global financial crisis. Since 
then, there has been much questioning of the effectiveness of such innovative tools (Wilson, 2009). 
Although Islamic financial institutions have not emerged from the 2008 financial crisis intact, Islamic 
banks were less adversely affected than their conventional counterparts (Chapra, 2009). It has also been 
argued that the constraints observed by the Islamic finance system could have provided a potential 
alternative to the conventional securitized products, which contributed to the crisis (Totaro, 2009)3. 
                                                          
2 Securitization is the financial practice of pooling types of contractual debt (or non-debt assets which generate 
receivables) and selling consolidated debt (or receivables) to third party investors as securities. The principal 
and interest on the debt, underlying the security, is paid back to the various investors regularly. Securitization 
has been applied mainly by financial institutions to expand their loan portfolios to offer new loans to lower 
income groups, accessible to subprime consumers (DeLorenzo, 2007; Totaro, 2009). In the United States the 
market for securitizations counted on two important assets; Asset backed securities (ABS) and Mortgage backed 
securities (MBS). Both types of debt contracts have played a crucial role in integrating securitization markets. 
MBS are securities created from the pooling of mortgages, which is then sold to investors. They have been 
developed by means of government-sponsored agencies (such as the Federal National Mortgage Association, 
known as Fannie Mae, and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation or Freddie Mac). The demand for 
these types of securities grew rapidly for institutional investors who were more willing to invest in credit risk 
(Bowden and Lorimer, 2009; Campbell et al., 2011; Casu et al. 2011).  These types of securities are prohibited 
in Islamic banks as it involves paying interest and the sale of debt. 
 
3Islamic finance is based on Shariah principles including the risk-sharing principle, the requirement of business 
ethical conduct; the provision of credit is primarily for the purchase of real goods and services. These principles 
also involve restrictions on all of the following; (i) the sale of debt, (ii) short sales, (iii) excessive uncertainty 
 
 
Islamic banking and finance has grown exponentially over the last 20 years, so much that it is now a 
notable feature in the global finance of the 21st century (Pollard & Samers, 2007). Over 500 Islamic 
financial institutions (IFIs) are now in existence, with estimated global Islamic banking assets of US$ 1.3 
trillion in 2011 (E&Y, 2012). Many international financial players (such as HSBC, CITI group, Dow 
Jones, FTSE and S&P) across the globe entered the IBF sector to tap into new markets, and enlarge their 
client base (Pollard & Samers, 2007).Asset securitization has been one of the most active Islamic debt 
market instruments, and one of the fastest growing industries in Islamic financial markets; it has been 
growing at a steady pace both in terms of size and number of issuances since the 2000s4 (Bassens et al. 
2013). The global sukuk market reached the USD100bln mark in terms of new issuances in 2013, with 
total issuances amounting to USD119.7bln as at end-2013 (MIFC, 2014).  
According to the social norm theory, previous research has emphasised on how religious adherence plays 
a determining role in financial and business decisions (Maltby, 1999; Waite and Lehrer, 2003; and Lehrer, 
2004; Hilary and Hu, 2009; Dyreng et al., 2012; McGuire et al., 2012). Religion has a substantial role in 
shaping and enforcing ethical behaviour, including honesty and justice. Religiosity induces social norms 
that foster sound moral judgement and ethical behaviour in corporations (Weaver and Agle, 2002). 
Similar to people, religious organisations are likely to be risk averse (Osoba, 2003; Hilary and Hu, 2009). 
Ethics research studies argue that individuals with stronger religious beliefs are less likely to accept 
morally questionable and risky decisions in a business environment (Longenecker et al., 2004; 
McCullough and Willoughby, 2009; and Vitell, 2009). IBs, as religiously oriented institutions, are expected 
to be more conservative when dealing with risk taking and capital adequacy.  
Furthermore, it is not only the cultural factor that is expected to influence bank risk for new issuers of 
asset securitization. The type of bank ownership tend to have a direct impact on securitization activity in 
banks either IBs or CBs.  Empirical literature on ownership structure broadly covers four ownership 
types (e.g. government, private (individual or families), foreign, and institutional ownership) identifying its 
impact on capitalization, risk-taking and bank liquidity (see Lee and Hsieh, 2014; Iannotta, Nocera, and 
Sironi, 2013; Barry, Lepetit, and Tarazi, 2011; Brown and Dinc, 2011; Farazi et al. 2011; Angkinand and 
Wihlborg, 2010; Iannotta, Nocera, and Sironi, 2007; Micco et al. 2007; Mian, 2006; Berger et al., 2005; 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and (iv) prohibitions to sell assets not owned. Islamic finance represents a distinct set of contractual and product 
structures that aim to achieve equivalent economic benefits as those offered by the conventional financial 
system. 
4From Malaysia, Sukuk securitization found its way to the Gulf Islamic markets, and was gradually introduced 
from 2001 onward via sovereign issuances in Bahrain and Qatar, later followed by sovereign and corporate 
issuances in the UAE and Saudi Arabia (Wilson, 2004).Investment in sukuk has been gaining popularity, not 
only by Muslim investors, but also by non-Muslim investors who seek to diversify their investment portfolios. 
However, the sukuk market was withheld briefly during the 2008–2009 crises. This shock itself illustrates the 
highly globalized nature of Islamic capital markets, as issuers have been suffering from low investment 
appetites at the time. This dip in sukuk issuance was also related to more ‘local’ events such as the Dubai debt 
crisis in 2009 (Bassens et al., 2010).  
 
 
 
Bonin et al., 2005; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Dinç, 2005; Acker and Athanassakos, 2003; Demirguc-Kunt 
and Detragiache, 2002; Claessens et al. 2001; Dages et al. 2000; Laeven, 1999; Pound, 1988). Due to 
better bailout guarantees, government ownership induce higher risk-taking given the fact that capital 
regulation restraint the lending ability, which eventually help them to enhance liquidity (Demirguc-Kunt 
and Detragiache, 2002; Iannotta, Nocera, & Sironi, 2007; Angkinand and Wihlborg, 2010; Brown and 
Dinc, 2011; Iannotta, Nocera, and Sironi, 2013; and Dong et al. 2014). Berger et al. (2005) and Iannota et 
al. (2007) also argue that banks with higher government ownership have higher default risk and hence, 
they anticipate poorer loan quality. However, Acker and Athanassakos (2003) stress that institutional 
investors (financial institutions and corporations) have a diversified portfolio of investments and they may 
have lower incentives to exercise control. Contrary to previous findings, Barry, Lepetit, and Tarazi (2011) 
argue that institutional investors impose the riskiest strategies when they hold higher stakes. 
 
The increasing volume of securitization activity in both banking sectors before the financial crisis raised 
the concerns of researchers, as well as those of investors and regulators over the potential for an increase 
in bank risk. Proponents argued that banks with constrained banking model were better shielded than 
their conventional counterparts from the impact of the financial crisis (Chapra, 2008; Ahmed, 2009; 
Ahmad, 2010) due to the constraints imposed on their activity securitisation process. Such claims need to 
be empirically tested both pre and post the financial crises identifying the impact of important 
institutional and cultural factors, religiosity and ownership5, given that the other counter claims that many 
Islamic banking products mimic (i.e. Murabahah) their conventional counterparts. In particular, this 
research investigates whether  controlling for different religiosity indicators alongside block ownerships 
for banks involved in new issuance of asset securitization would promote lower risk and better capital 
adequacy on average and during periods of financial distress 
While empirical work has been undertaken in providing cross-country evidence on the relative financial 
stability of CBs and IBs (see Čihák and Hesse, 2010; Abedifar et al. 2012; Beck et al. 2013), these tests 
cover certain aspects of the bank performance including the business model, efficiency and asset quality. 
However, none of the studies, to the best of our knowledge, has tested the impact of asset securitizations 
activity on bank risk for both banking sectors. An additional contribution of this study includes 
identifying the imperative impacts of the cultural and institutional factors on both banking industries’ 
asset securitization activities, showing their significant impact on banks’ risk taking behaviour   Our study 
updates the existing evidence on asset securitization by employing unique and comprehensive data for 
global asset securitization.  
. Tests compare between banks involved in asset securitizations (representing constrained Islamic asset 
securitization as well as CBs) versus banks that do not issue asset securitization in 22 countries. Empirical 
tests employ the two-step GMM estimation for the panel data of 672 global banks (4889 year-
observations) for the pooled sample period (2003-2012). We believe that both constraints imposed on 
                                                          
5Allen and Wood (2006) define financial stability as state of affairs in which exogenous shocks are unlikely to 
occur. 
 
 
Islamic Finance product structures as well as the crises period provide a unique setting for our testing for 
both types of banks; given that bankers are more likely to deviate from accounting standards and 
regulatory requirements during periods of financial distress (Hofmann, 2012). .  We use accounting-based 
information to identify measures which capture each of (a) capital adequacy (Capital adequacy ratio hereafter, 
CAR) (b) credit risk (non-performing loans to gross loans and loan loss reserves to gross loans ratios) and (c) liquidity 
management risk (liquid assets total deposit and borrowings and net loans to total assets ratios). Two proxies are 
employed for religiosity.  The first is bank type (Islamic or conventional) and the second is country 
religiosity (the ratio of Muslim population to total population). Testing for the ownership hypothesis 
analyses for the bank’s largest block owner (holding 10% or more) for of each type of bank ownership 
(Financial institution, corporate, family, government and foreign). Our results show that on average banks 
with higher securitisation activity have low capital adequacy ratio and higher net loans to total assets 
indicating poor liquidity position. Controlling for the financial crisis period (2008-2009), we find 
consistent negative association between securitisation activity and both CAR and net loans to total assets 
indicating that banks with higher securitisation activity persistently report poor capital adequacy and a 
higher liquidity risk. Securitization activity is negatively associated with capital adequacy and positivity 
associated with liquidity risk (net loans to total deposits ratio) after controlling for both religiosity proxies. 
Examining the risk profile of banks with high securitisation activity comparing Muslim majority countries 
and Non-Muslim majority countries. Tests within Muslim majority country indicate that bank 
securitization activity are involved in lower credit risk (lower loan loss reserves to gross loans ratio). No 
significant association was found with capital adequacy or liquidity risks. However, within the subsample 
of non-Muslim majority countries, banks with higher securitization activity have significantly lower capital 
adequacy and significantly higher liquidity risk (net loans to total assets ratio), implying a different risk 
profile for countries with higher concentration of Muslim majority.  In line with predictions, IBs reported 
a more conservative approach by keeping higher loan loss reserves to gross loans ratio and higher ratio of 
liquid assets to total deposit ratios, as compared to their conventional counterparts.  These findings are 
consistent with prior studies claims (Chapra, 2008; Ahmed, 2009; Ahmed, 2010) that IBs appear to have a 
more prudent approach as compared with their conventional counterparts  by holding a significantly 
higher reserves ratio for impaired assets. These overall, findings imply that the risk exposure of banks 
with higher securitization activity in the pooled sample is driven by risk profile of securitised banks in 
non-Muslim majority countries.  These findings also previous research which has emphasised on how 
religiosity is an important determinant in financial decisions and how it mitigates risk (Maltby, 1999; Waite 
and Lehrer, 2003; and Lehrer, 2004; Hilary and Hu, 2009; Dyreng et al., 2012; McGuire et al., 2012). 
Testing for the second hypothesis related to the impact of ownership structure on bank risk, we find that 
banks with higher securitisation activity have consistently shown lower capital adequacy and higher 
liquidity ratio. Controlling for the largest block for financial institutions ownership, highlighted an 
additional type of risk which is credit risk as shown by the significantly low loan loss reserves to gross 
loans. However, specific inferences are drawn from additional sub-sampling analyses for each type of 
 
 
ownership indicating changed risk profile for banks with new issuance of asset securitizations. Our results 
highlight the importance of identifying the impact of both culture factors, such as religiosity, and 
ownership type in global banking studies. (e.g. Abedifar et al. 2013; Beck et al., 2014). 
The next section discusses the study background followed by hypotheses development in section 3.  The 
methodology and data are covered in sections 4 and 5 respectively followed by the results and conclusion 
in sections 6 and 7.  
2. Background: 
Conventional asset securitization reflects a flexible structured finance technique of liquidity, which 
involves risk transfer and the conversions of present or future asset claims of varying maturity and quality 
into tradable debt securities (DeLorenzo, 2007; Totaro, 2009). In a typical transaction, the originating 
bank transfers a pool of financial assets with fixed or nearly fixed cash flows to an SPV. This represents a 
legal entity that in turn finances the purchase through the issuance of securities backed by the pool. These 
securities must also be grouped in one of the top two ratings as determined by an accredited credit rating 
agency, and usually pay periodic payments that are similar to coupon payments. (Bowden and Lorimer, 
2009). 
Conventional securitization has become popular for some reasons, among them are; first, it allowed 
financial institutions to have a direct and quick alternative to access the capital markets (Leyshon and 
Thrift, 2007). Second, securitization provides more diversified product portfolios for large institutional 
investors. Third, securitization enables banks to better satisfy capital adequacy requirements by Basel II, 
through a preoccupation transfer of liabilities to become an off-balance item. Hence, banks can 
circumvent the adequacy capital ratio imposed by Basel, which limited the size of outstanding loans vis-a-
vis equity capital (Aalbers et al., 2011).  
With the financial crisis in 2008 being originated from the US subprime and extended worldwide, the 
world had a housing boom which led to financial turmoil in the United States and many other countries 
(Taylor, 2009). Dissipating of liquidity has been caused by the consecutive contamination of the different 
classes of financing products in the credit market alongside the freezing of non-government credit 
markets, such as commercial papers and bonds (Kiff and Kisser, 2010). The inflated capital costs led to 
the occurrence of the credit crisis and to the failure of financial institutions with poor credit profiles and a 
weak liquidity position. Both the large injection of money from banks into the mortgage bond market as 
well as the high volume of lending practices by the mortgage brokers, banks and others accelerated the 
subprime crisis. This in fact has exposed the global banking system to high vulnerability to both 
insolvency and credit risks.  Economists have asserted that the crisis revealed the weaknesses of 
conventional finance to mitigate exogenous finance shocks (Parashar and Venkatesh, 2010; Alasrag, 
2010). 
Rising competition and continuing efforts to provide innovative products have together contributed 
to a growing interest in Islamic banking. IBs as religious-oriented type of banks enjoy a higher trust 
 
 
premium in predominantly Muslim countries like Malaysia, Pakistan, Egypt, and the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC). In the economic realm, for instance, Islamic religion plays a catalytic role in shaping risk 
taking for financial institutions. This is justifies by the principles of assuring the economic well-being of 
the whole community protecting minorities as well as equitable distribution of wealth (Slahudin, 2008). 
Moreover, financial practices and accompanying legal instruments are affected by Shariah compliant 
finance framework which conforms to Islamic law (Elasrag, 2014; Lewis, 2005).  
As such, in principle, Islamic banking differs significantly from conventional finance, given the 
prohibition both of interest and speculation, in addition to the assumed dominance of the profit and risk 
sharing principle. These in fact are likely to pose substantial differences with respect to product and 
activity structures between IBs and CBs. In line with the imperative claims made about the added 
protection for Islamic finance against excessive risk-taking, the Islamic banking sector attracted more 
attention during and after the financial crisis. The peculiar nature of IBs that all financial transactions, 
must be either trade-based or asset-linked in addition to the extra governance layer (Shariah supervisory 
board), encourage more resilience in the system (Chapra, 2008; Ahmed, 2010). Islamic banking 
contractual arrangements are likely to bring greater scrutiny and stricter oversight by depositors and 
investors alike. Hence, Islamic banking does not allow the provision of credit to subprime borrowers 
(Desai, 2008).   
 
Comparative studies between IBs and CBs, on bases of general banking system and product 
structures, provide mixed results.  While Yudistira (2003) find that IBs suffered from inefficiencies during 
1998-1999, Iqbal (2001), Hussein (2004) and Siddiqui (2008) found that IBs outperformed their 
conventional counterparts using different performance measures and different research methodologies.  
This was clearer during the recent global financial crisis of 2008 (Khamis et al., 2010; Hassan and Dridi, 
2010).  On the other hand, Čihák and Hesse, (2010) report that small IBs tend to be financially stronger 
than small commercial banks, while large commercial banks tend to be financially stronger than large IBs. 
They also show that small IBs tend to be financially stronger than large IBs. Abedifar et al. (2012) find no 
significant difference between the two banking sectors, with respect to the insolvency risk. Their finding 
on credit risk is mixed, varying according to which proxy for credit risk is used. Beck et al. (2013) show 
insignificant differences between IBs and CBs in their business orientation. However, they find that IBs 
are less cost-effective, but have a higher intermediation ratio, higher asset quality and are better 
capitalized. They find no significant evidence for the financial stability of both IBs and CBs during the 
recent financial crisis.  
 
 
 
 
 
3. Hypotheses Development:  
3.1 Hypothesis 1: Religiosity:  
In spite of enabling banks to convert illiquid assets into liquid funds, it has been argued that securitization 
is likely to increase the expansion of credit and cause banks to hold riskier assets. Existing conventional 
banking literature on the former issue shows that securitization impairs a bank’s financial condition and 
increases risk (Calomiris and Mason 2004; Cebenoyan and Strahan 2004; Loutskina and Strahan 2006; 
Purnanandam 2009; Casu et al. 2011). Dionne and Harchaoui (2003) find a positive association between 
securitization and bank credit risk. Franke and Krahnen (2005) and Haensel and Krahnen (2007) report 
that collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) increase the systematic risk of the issuing bank. Dell’Ariccia et 
al. (2009), Mian and Sufi (2009), and Keys et al. (2010) suggest that banks securitized their worst mortgage 
loans to pass on their credit risks to new investors. In line with Cantor and Rouyer (2000), credit risk for 
the issuer improves if the riskiness of the securities sold to investors is higher than that of the issuer prior 
to the securitization. However, it might be the case that the transaction intensifies the issuer’s net 
exposure to the default risk of its assets. Affinito and Tagliaferri (2010) reveal that securitization allows 
the bank to decrease the weight of bad loans to operate with lower capital, or to invest the capital into 
new businesses. Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) also find evidence to suggest that securitization reduces 
bank risk, but banks use the achieved risk reduction to undertake new risks. Purnanandam (2009) stresses 
that banks use the proceeds from securitizations to issue new loans with higher-than-average default risk. 
In terms of profitability and returns, as securitization provides banks with an additional source of loan 
financing and liquidity, banks are likely to be motivated to shift their portfolios toward higher risk to 
obtain higher return assets (Cebenoyan and Strahan 2004; Purnanandam 2009). However, issuing banks 
will still retain the first-loss of contractual interests in order to provide implicit recourse in securitizations. 
This indicates that the risks inherent in the securitized assets have not been fully transferred to investors 
and are, in effect, still held by the issuing bank, but off-balance sheet (Calomiris and Mason 2004; Higgins 
and Mason 2004; Niu and Richardson 2006; Chen, Liu, and Ryan 2008; Vermilyea, Webb, and Kish 
2008).  
 
 
With the above extant evidence suggesting that banks securitize their riskier loans while retaining safer 
ones on their balance sheets, religiosity tend to operate as an important cultural control mechanism which 
has an impact on financial reporting and risk (Callen and Fang 2013).  A well-established branch of 
literature has identified impact of religiosity on corporate economic attitudes (Barro and McCleary 2003, 
Stulz and Williamson 2003). On the other hand, the constrained model of Islamic securitisation might 
expose them to specific types of risks such as liquidity. Managing liquidity is more challenging in IBs than 
CBs given the limited capacity of IBs to attract Shariah compliant instruments (since the returns on these 
accounts are uncertain) alongside the expected high operational costs and lower profitability under debt-
 
 
based contract arrangements (Olson and Zoubi, 2008; Hasan and Dridi, 2010). Olson and Zoubi (2008) 
indicate that IBs recently operate within new and unfamiliar structures of finance which tend to cause 
long-term liquidity challenges. They suggest that IBs should hold more cash relative to deposits than 
conventional banks due to the high risk of deposits withdrawal by existing clients. 
Both the religiosity orientations as well as the extra layer of governance (Shariah supervisory board), 
drive expectations for IBs to be more conservative and lower risk taking (Lewis, 2005)6. Islamic finance 
principles are based on the concepts of equality and justice in communities through financing real 
economic activities (Ahmed, 1991).  These concepts represent the base of a comprehensive framework 
for financial reporting and risk taking (Baydoun and Willett, 1994; Lewis, 2001). In addition, the asset-
backing model is one of the fundamental criterion in IBs since all contracts must be attached to the 
nature of the contracts and should be based on real economic activities (Jobst, 2007).  In this regard, 
Shari’ah in IBs primarily prohibits arbitrage in transactions through requiring a clear link between assets 
and securitization transactions (Bashir, 1999) and hence, IBs have restricted access to market sources to 
meet liquidity requirements, which are relatively more expensive due to the Shariah compliance condition. 
Therefore, predictions reflect a negative association between risk taking and religiosity which is expected 
to have a direct influence for risk taking for banks issuing asset securitizations. 
Further, compliance with Basel II requirements for capitalization by IBs since December 2005 implies 
that the composition of eligible capital and risk weighted assets is strictly determined by the nature of the 
market and credit risk for IBs (IFSB, 2005)7. With the relative short history of Islamic banking and the 
small niche in many countries for Sukuk issuance, IBs is expected to be better capitalised than securitized 
(SEC) in CBs. This is attributable to their limited access to market resources to cover unexpected losses 
and their needs to protect investment accountholders and depositors’ wealth alongside the need to 
comply with strict capital adequacy requirements of Basel II8. he existing literature comparing IBs and 
CBs also provide evidence that IBs are better capitalized than CBs (Beck et al., 2013). Particularly, Iqbal 
(2001) demonstrates that IBs are well capitalized and make effective use of the resources at their disposal. 
Nevertheless, Ariss (2010) argues that IBs are better capitalized and hold significantly higher equity to 
assets ratios than CBs.  
                                                          
6 Islamic banks (IBs) must adhere to both regulations set by regulators as well as the principles of Shariah (Archer et al. 
1998). The purpose of Shariah compliant finance is to shape financial practices and accompanying legal instruments that 
conform to Islamic law (Elasrag, 2014). Shariah prohibits interest and speculation and it calls for alternative modes of 
trading where the underlying products are real assets or services. Capital providers including investors are usually concerned 
that their funds should be invested in a Shariah compliant manner (Chapra and Ahmed, 2002). 
7The capital adequacy standard for IBs addresses the different risks faced by this sector, and assigns a different set of risk 
weights to different Islamic financing modes. 
 
8Large banks are likely exploit more finance arbitrage transactions such as securitizations or rephrase agreements than small 
banks, which might cause less diversified portfolios. Well capitalized banks are likely to have access to cheaper and less 
risky sources of funds (Bourke, 1989).   
 
 
 
IBs are predominantly viewed as risk-averse institutions (Mills and Presley, 1999; Zaher and Hassan, 
2001; and Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005) and are likely to entail lower credit risk, and thus to deliver better 
asset quality than CBs. This may be attributable to the added corporate governance layer of the Shari’ah 
Supervisory Board (SSB) in Islamic banking system. The restricted contractual arrangements and the 
rigorous governance supervision are associated with lower risk in IBs and lower level of adverse selection 
and/or moral hazard (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005; Beck et al., 2013). Khan (2010a) also stresses that IBs 
have a higher deposit base and lower credit defaults. In addition, Abedifar et al. (2012) demonstrate that 
IBs are characterized by lower credit risk than CBs.  
Further, managing liquidity is more challenging in IBs than CBs given the limited capacity of IBs to 
attract Shariah compliant instruments (Hasan and Dridi, 2010). Olson and Zoubi (2008) indicate that IBs 
recently operate within new and unfamiliar structures of finance, which tend to cause long-term liquidity 
challenges. Islam and Chowdhury (2009) find that IBs reflect comparatively weak liquidity management 
than CBs. The infrastructure and constrained tools for liquidity risk management for IBs is in its infancy 
in many jurisdictions and Sukuk issuance for IBs might not be the magic tool for resolving liquidity 
challenge for this particular banking sector. 
Accordingly,, we conjecture that religiosity in general terms will positively affect the credit profile and risk 
taking behaviour in banks involves in new issuances of asset securitization.  The religiosity factor exposes 
banks, in principle, to better capitalization and lower risk taking . This leads us to the first hypothesis 
stated in the alternative form:.  
 
3.2 Hypothesis 2: Bank Ownership, Capital Regulation, Risk-taking, and Liquidity:  
Agency problem related to separation of ownership and control is come to spotlight while bank type is 
the prime issue of discussion. Theoretically, publicly held banks ensure greater dispersion of ownership, 
which enhance separation between shareholder and manager and increase information asymmetry and 
consequently create divergence in incentives, whereas privately held banks drive less separation between 
shareholder and manager and hence, their incentive are closely aligned to those of shareholders (Bliss and 
Flannery, 2002; Flannery, 2001). However, the incentive mechanism is seen different in nationalized and 
state-owned banks. Particularly, political or social mission drives incentive mechanism in nationalized and 
state-owned banks (Iannotta, Nocera, and Sironi, 2013). In addition, the ownership and control either in 
foreign or domestic banks implies differences in terms of market discipline and their access to capital 
markets. Market discipline is one of the three pillars in Basel accord, along with capital regulation and 
banking supervision. Thus, market discipline plays an important role on bank type, which is considered as 
a useful instrument to enhance banking supervision or to mitigate shareholders’ risk-taking incentives. 
Nevertheless, given the fact that the market is expected to monitor and/or influence banks’ risk behavior, 
and therefore, the impact of ownership changes on risk cannot be assessed without considering incentives 
driven by financial markets in terms of discipline (Bliss and Flannery, 2002; Flannery, 2001).  
Further, private or family ownership might have different objectives in terms of growth and risk-return 
strategies. Private equity is less liquid than other ownership type (e.g. public), which restraint their faster 
growth opportunities and more risk-taking. Barry, Lepetit, and Tarazi (2011) demonstrate that a higher 
 
 
equity stake of either individuals/ families is associated with a decrease in asset risk and default risk. 
However, Laeven (1999) has quite opposite findings. He finds that family-owned banks were among the 
most risky banks. The empirical evidence on foreign ownership is mixed. Laeven (1999) finds foreign-
owned banks took little risk relative to other banks. But Angkinand and Wihlborg (2010) indicate that 
foreign ownership is associated with greater risk-taking and consequently less financial stability. One the 
other hand, Lee and Hsieh (2014) offer a U-shaped relation between foreign ownership and stability is 
supported. But, Dages et al. (2000) document that foreign ownership appear to contribute to greater 
stability since it is considered as a key good governance. 
H2: The ownership structure of banks positively affect their risk-taking behaviour and capital adequacy.  
Data and Model: 
We employ an unbalanced panel dataset and a country variable criterion, reflecting countries with at least 
four banks and having at least two observations for each bank, following Beck et al. (2013). Based on this 
sample identification process, our final sample includes banks operating within 22 countries where IBs 
have presence.9 Our sample comprises 672 banks (4889 bank-year observations) including 136 IBs (865 
year-observations) and 536 CBs (4024 year-observations) for the period of 2003-2012. We collect bank-
level data from “Bankscope” and the “Banker” databases. Country-level variables and macroeconomic 
data are collected from the World Bank and IMF websites. Our unique comprehensive asset 
securitization data set is hand collected from securities’ prospectuses and banks’ annual reports. Financial 
data are collected from Bankscope and Zawya.  
The description of the sample is included in Table 1. This Table reports the sample composition by 
country and bank type. We find that banks with SEC represent 14% of the total sample composition. For 
IBs, the highest concentration of SEC banks is located in Malaysia, UAE, and Bahrain.   
Insert Table 1 about here 
Measures of endogenous variables 
We include three measures of endogenous variables for capitalization, credit risk and liquidity. Following 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) and Beck et al. (2013), we employ bank capital adequacy measure, 
the capital adequacy ratio (CAR), calculated as (Tier 1 + Tier 2)/total Risk weighted assets. CAR reflects 
the legal regulatory requirements for capitalization that measures adequacy level and buffers maintained 
(Fonseca and González, 2010; Buch and Prieto, 2014; Ebrahim et al., 2014). Following prior literature we 
measure credit risk by loan loss reserves to gross loans and non-performing loans to gross loans ratios 
(Gonzalezet al., 2005; Lepetit et al., 2008; Abedifar et al., 2013; Beck et al., 2013)10. The loan loss reserve 
represents an estimate of credit losses inherent in a bank’s loan portfolio. Finally, the liquidity indicator 
                                                          
9 The countries are Algeria, Bangladesh, Brunei, Mauritania, Iraq, Jordon, Kuwait, Bahrain, Egypt Lebanon, 
Malaysia, Mauritania, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Turkey, 
United kingdom and Yemen. 
 
10 Non-performing loans are defined as loans in the bank’s portfolio overdue for more than 90 days on interest 
or principal payments. They are disclosed as supplemental financial statement information (Wahlen, 1994). 
 
 
reflects a bank’s ability to repay short-term obligations. We use the liquid assets to total deposits and 
borrowings ratio, as well as the net loans to total assets ratio to measure bank liquidity management (Beck 
et al., 2013).  
 
Measures of Explanatory Variables: 
 
The key explanatory variable in this study is asset securitization activity. This variable is measured as the 
total securitization for bank i at time t issuance deflated by total assets (Barth et al., Casu et al., 2011) 
Following prior literature (Dusuki and Mokhtar, 2008; AAOIFI, 2008; Casu et al. 2011; Campbell et al., 
2011), we restrict the definition of asset securitization to represent banks involved only in a first-year 
issuance, either through SPV or the bank itself, for asset securitization (Sukuk vs. conventional securities) 
backed by underlying assets. We find that sukuk issuance is referred to as asset securitization in Islamic 
banking, and IBs usually use the two terms interchangeably to report about their securitization process. 
Additional criteria for Islamic securitization include a non-conditional sukuk asset structure that involves 
a separate issuance at market price (AAOIFI, 2008). We control for two religiosity indicators (1) a bank 
type indicator dummy (IBs) equal 1 if it is an Islamic bank and 0 if it a conventional bank (2) the ratio of 
Muslim population to the total population of a country. We used five ownership ratios (Financial 
institution, corporate, family, government and foreign) all expressed as total shares owned to the total 
disclosed shares. The financial institutions ratio includes all shareholders classified by either ORBIS or 
Zawya as financial institutions, mutual funds, Insurance companies; Banks etc. Corporate ownership 
ratio includes all firms that are not part of financial institutions or private owners. Family ownership ratio 
includes individual shareholders or their families. Also in this category fall privately owned firms, in other 
words firms that are wholly owned by ether a single private investor or a group of private investors. 
We control for size using the natural logarithm of total bank assets. Size accounts for big banks that 
might have smaller capital buffers and hence, are more risky, which according to the ‘‘too-big-to-fail” 
hypothesis suggests that large banks will receive regulatory support during financial distress, or when they 
have lower risk as a consequence of the enhanced diversification of their asset portfolio (Olson and 
Zoubi, 2008; Parashar and Venkatesh, 2010; Fonseca and González, 2010; Abedifar et al., 2013; Beck et 
al., 2013). We control for bank age to proxy bank’s capability and informational advantages to control for 
risks (DeYoung and Hasan, 1998). We also consider the bank’s non-interest income as an indicator for 
the bank inefficiency. An increase in the share of non-interest income in total operating income is 
expected to lower bank financial performance and stability, since an increased reliance on non-interest 
income raises the volatility of bank loan portfolios without a direct link to increased profits (DeYoung 
and Roland, 2001; Stiroh 2010). Banks with a high share of non-operating income have high insolvency 
risk (Lepetit et al., 2008). We also include equity to total assets as an independent variable in both the 
credit risk and insolvency models to control for leverage. 
 
 
We control for a set of macroeconomic variables including market power through a proxy for the 
market share of deposits measures, as the total banks deposits over total banking sector deposits (Berger, 
1995; Hasan et al., 2013). We also control for country governance factors including the rule of law and 
regulatory quality as intuitional measures for the both the enforcement mechanisms and legal systems (La 
Porta et al. 1997; Djankov et al., 2007; Fang et al. 2014). The country’s prevailing inflation rate is 
included, and the growth in the prosperity of the population is also controlled for by including the growth 
in GDP per capita (Fang et al. 2014; Mili et al. 2014). According to Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1998) bank crises are more prevalent in countries having low GDP growth, and high inflation and real 
interest rates. In periods with high economic growth, demands on loans and financial services provided 
by both IBs and CBs are likely to increase. This is expected to increase bank cash flow, interest earnings 
and profits. As our study period falls within the crisis, we predict the growth variable, GDP to be a 
negative determinant of bank performance (Subramanian et al., 2013). Regarding the inflation variable, in 
conventional banking high inflation rates should lead to higher loan rates which in turn would lead to 
higher revenues (Bashir, 2000; Haron, 2004). As for IBs, inflation is likely to be positively associated with 
performance only, if a large portion of IBs profits accrues from debt-based contracts (i.e. Murabaha) 
(Subramanian et al., 2013). In our study, with the assumption that Islamic banking is currently mostly 
based on debt rather than equity-based contracts, we expect inflation to have a positive effect on IB 
performance. In addition, because IBs are prohibited from charging fixed interest rates, profitability is 
likely to be positively associated with the domestic inflation rate.  
Empirical models and estimation methods: 
Our main models are developed as follows: 
CAPi,t = β0 + β1CAPi,t−1 + β2SECi,t + β3IBsi + β4SIZEit+ β7 AGEit + β8 NONINTit + + β9 MACROi,j,t
+ εi,t … . (1) 
  CRi,t = β0 + β1CRi,t−1 + β2SECi,t + β3IBsi + β4SIZEit+ β7 AGEit + β8 NON_INTit + + β9 MACROi,j,t
+ εi,t  … . . (2)                                                                                                                               
LIQi,t = β0 + β1LIQi,t−1 + β2SECi,t + β3IBsi + β4SIZEit+ β7 AGEit + β8 NON_INTit + + β9 MACROi,j,t
+ εi,t … … . . (3)                                                                                                                             
          
CAPi,t = Bank capital adequacy ratio for bank i in time t. 
CRi,t = Credit risk indicators for bank i in time t. 
LIQi,t = Liquidity indicators for bank i in time t. 
CAPi,t−1 = The first lag of bank capital adequacy indicator for bank i in time t. 
CRi,t−1 = The first lag of credit risk indicators for bank i in time t. 
LIQi,t−1 = The first lag of liquidity indicators for bank i in time t. 
 
SECi,t = asset securitization activity measured as the total securitization for bank i at time t issuance 
deflated by total assets at time t. 
 
IBsi = Dummy variable equal 1 for an IB and 0 for CB. 
 
 
 
Sizei,t = Natural logarithm of the total bank assets for bank i at time t. 
 
AGEit= Age of bank i at time t since the year of its establishment, 
 
NON_INTit= Total Non-Interest Operating Income for bank i at time t, 
 
MACROi,j,t =  A set of Country level macroeconomic variables for country j at time t, 
 
εit = White-noise error term. 
4  
The definition of variables is included in Table 2. 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Estimation method: 
 
We employ a two-step generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator, developed for dynamic models 
of panel data to examine the impact of bank asset securitization on the capitalization, credit risk and 
liquidity of both IBs and CBs. This model is developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and has been 
modified by Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998). The model incorporates both 
difference GMM and system GMM. The in-difference GMM takes the first-difference equation to 
eliminate the country-specific effects, through using lagged level of dependent variable as instruments. To 
overcome the problem of weak instruments, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) 
developed system GMM to combine the level regression and difference equations, using lagged 
differences as instruments. Therefore, this two-step estimator functions efficiently to control for time-
invariant fixed effects, which we eliminate by taking first-differences of all variables, and the 
autoregressive process in the data for each financial performance indicator. We include lagged dependent 
variables model to capture the dynamic nature of these variables and the potential presence of 
endogeneity of the explanatory variables, using instrumental variables based on three period lagged values 
of the explanatory variables (Blundell and Bond, 1998). We checked the model specification using Sargan 
test for over-identifying restrictions. We also employ the Arellano and Bond's test for zero 
autocorrelation which determines if the first differenced residuals are free from second order serial 
correlation. The existing studies in banking research employ similar approach (e.g. Fonseca and González, 
2010; Wintoki et al. 2012; and Flannery and Hankins, 2013). Using GMM estimations, 11 Models are 
specified and separately estimated using the above mentioned risk indicators. 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics: 
 
 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of our data. We report the descriptive statistics for full sample in 
Panel A, IBs sub-sample in Panel B and CBs sub-sample in Panel C.  
Table 3 shows statistics for banks involved in asset securitization activity, both SEC IBs sub-sample 
(Panel A) and SEC CBs sub-sample (Panel B). SEC IBs appear to be more adequately capitalized than 
SEC CBs, with higher average for both CAR and EtoTA CBs. Ratios for asset quality indicate poorer 
quality for SEC IBs as compared to SEC CBs, implying higher credit risk though the results show more 
prudence by SEC IBs holding more loan loss reserves to gross loans as a safety cushion against expected 
risk. SEC IBs report a higher average of operational efficiency than SEC CBs; with lower means for both 
the costs to income ratio and overheads to total assets ratio. Comparison on the basis of earnings ability 
shows that SEC IBs have higher ROAA and higher ROAE, on average, than SEC CBs. SEC IBs report 
higher liquidity management with higher mean (median) for the liquid assets/total deposits and 
borrowing ratio as well as higher net loans to total assets ratio than SEC CBs. On average, SEC IBs are 
smaller in size, younger and appear to be less vulnerable to insolvency risk (lower mean for non-interest 
income) as compared to SEC CBs.  
Empirical Results and Robustness Checks: 
In this section we present the results of testing the impact of securitisation activity on bank risk on 
average and during the financial crisis.  We then present the results of testing the impact of religiosity and 
ownership type on the risk profile of banks with high securitisation  
Securitisation Activity and Bank Risk  
We start the analysis by examining the impact of asset securitization activity (ratio of bank securitised 
assets to total assets) on bank risk (capital adequacy as well as credit and liquidity risks).  The analysis 
(Table 4) shows that on average banks with higher securitisation activity have low capital adequacy ratio 
and higher net loans to total assets indicating poor liquidity position. These results support prior claims 
and are consistent with predictions that securitization activity is positively associated with more risk 
taking. This initial analysis indicates that in our sample (countries with dual banking systems), 
securitisation activity, on average, has not helped banks to manage their liquidity or their capital adequacy.  
We then control for the financial crisis period (2008-2009), to explore changes in these banks risk 
exposure during the crisis.  As shown in (Table 5), we find that the negative association between 
securitisation activity and capital adequacy continues during the crisis implying that banks with higher 
securitisation activity persistently scored low in capital adequacy during the whole period of study. 
Additionally, the results showed a significant negative association between higher securitisation activity 
and net loans to total assets implying a higher liquidity risk. These results indicate, consistent with 
predictions that banks involved in higher asset securitization activity exhibit higher risk.  Our findings 
conform to results presented in previous studies (Dionne and Harchaoui, 2003; Uzun and Webb, 2007; 
 
 
Jiangli and Pritsker, 2008; Altunbas et al. 2009; Cardone-Riportella et al. 2010; Casu et al. 2011; and Barth 
et al. 2012).  
Testing the impact of religiosity on securitised banks’ risk  
 
As explained earlier, Islamic banks, as religiously oriented institutions, are expected to be more 
conservative when dealing with risk.  On the other hand, their constrained model of securitisation might 
expose them to specific types of risks such as liquidity.  Under this set of analyses we further test the 
impact of bank type on securitised banks’ risk profile in countries with a dual banking system (Islamic and 
conventional banks) using two proxies for religiosity.  The first is bank type (Islamic or conventional) and 
the second is country religiosity (the ratio of Muslim population to total population).  
 
Controlling for bank type (Table 6), we find that banks with higher securitisation activity have 
significantly lower capital adequacy and offer higher ratio of net loans to total assets confirming their 
higher risk exposure.  On the other hand, Islamic banks showed, as expected, a more conservative 
approach by keeping higher loan loss reserves to gross loans ratio and higher ratio of liquid assets to total 
deposit ratios, as compared to their conventional counterparts.  Our findings provide additional empirical 
evidence to that presented to by Čihák and Hesse, 2010) Hasan and Dridi (2010); Abedifar et al. (2013) 
and Beck et al. (2013) to support prior studies’ claims (Chapra, 2008; Ahmed, 2009; Ahmed, 2010), on the 
conservative behaviour and resilience of Islamic banks in general.   
Additional tests are constructed for the impact of religiosity on securitised banks’ risk exposure, we 
control for the second religiosity proxy (the ratio of the Muslim population to the total population).  
Results (Table 7) show a similar high-risk profile for banks with higher securitisation activity to the results 
of the pooled sample. Securitization activity is negatively associated with capital adequacy and positivity 
associated with liquidity risk (net loans to total deposits ratio) after controlling for both religiosity proxies. 
These results are also consistent during the financial crisis (Table 8). 
We then conduct analyses examining the risk profile of banks with high securitisation activity within each 
of the subsamples of; Muslim majority countries and Non-Muslim majority countries. Tests within 
Muslim majority country indicate that bank securitization activity is marginally associated with lower loan 
loss reserve to gross loans ratio (Table 9) implying a lower credit risk. No significant association was 
found with capital adequacy or liquidity risks. We also find that Islamic banks continue in maintaining 
significantly higher ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans and marginally lower net loans to total assets, 
confirming their conservative risk profile as compared with their conventional counterparts. Further tests 
within the subsample of non-Muslim majority countries (Table 10), show that banks with higher 
securitization activity had significantly lower capital adequacy and significantly higher liquidity risk (net 
 
 
loans to total assets ratio), implying a similar risk profile of these banks to the profile of the pooled 
sample.  In addition, we find in the subsample of non-majority Muslim countries, that the Islamic banks’ 
dummy is no longer significant implying no significant difference between the risk profile of Islamic and 
conventional banks in non-Muslin majority countries.  
In summary, these particular set of tests show that the risk exposure of banks with higher 
securitization activity in the pooled sample is driven by the risk exposure of securitised banks in non-
Muslim majority countries.  Our results highlight the importance of identifying the impact of culture 
factors (such as religiosity) in global banking studies. (e.g. Abedifar et al. 2013; Beck et al., 2014).   
 
 Testing the impact of ownership type on securitised Banks’ risk  
Testing for the second hypothesis related to the impact of ownership structure on bank risk, we test the 
impact of various types of bank ownerships and also conduct additional analyses within the subsamples 
of each type of bank ownership (Financial institution, corporate, private employee, government and 
foreign). Due to possible collinearity between various types of ownership, we run separate models for 
each type of ownership.  The various models for the ownership are presented in Tables 10, 11, 12, 13 and 
1411.  Results, in the three tables show that those banks with higher securitisation activity have 
consistently shown lower capital adequacy and higher liquidity ratio (higher ratio of net loans to total 
assets).  In addition, controlling for bank financial institutions ownership, in the pooled sample, 
highlighted an additional type of risk that these banks faced which is credit risk as shown by the 
significantly low loan loss reserves to gross loans. The Islamic banks conservative risk profile has not 
changed in these models from the previous results.  
 
For further insights on the impact of ownership on securitised banks risk profile we clustered our sample 
according to the bank’s largest block owner (holding 10% or more).  We then conduct the analysis within 
each subsample. Testing, in Table 15, within the subsample of the largest block of financial institutions 
ownership, results show that banks with higher securitization activity report higher liquid assets to total 
deposits ratio and have lower net loans to total assets ratio, implying better liquidity position. No 
evidence on capital adequacy was found. IBs show a marginal positive evidence for loan loss reserve to 
gross loans ratio.  
 
Table 16, shows the results of tests within the subsample of the largest block corporate ownership.  We 
find banks with higher securitization activity have significantly higher capital adequacy with no evidence 
for other risk indicators while Islamic banks report lower capital adequacy. These results are also similar 
to tests (Table 17) within the subsample of majority of family ownership.  However, within this 
                                                          
11 Unreported results controlling for government ownership type show no significant evidence on bank risk and 
asset securitization.  
 
 
subsample Islamic banks report significantly positive loan loss reserve to gross loans implying the 
robustness of their conservative risk behaviour. 
 
Tests within the majority of employee ownership show no significant evidence for bank asset 
securitization. Tests within the subsample with of the largest block of government ownership (Table 18) 
indicate that banks with higher securitization activity show poor capital adequacy as well as weak liquidity 
position given the high net loans to total asset ratio. IBs report significantly high non-performing loans to 
gross loans and higher loan loss reserve to gross loans. The results imply a higher risk profile for 
securitised banks that are majority government owned. In Table 19, tests within majority of foreign 
ownership subsample show no significant evidence on bank securitization activity. 
 
Our results further confirm the importance of identifying the impact of bank ownership structure on the 
risk profile of banks in global banking studies. 
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Table 2:  Definition and Descriptions for the Test Variables: 
   This Table provides definitions and notations for test variables in the empirical models examined in this study. 
 
Variables  Definitions 
1. Capitalization Proxies: 
a) CARi,t 
b) EtoTAi,t 
a) Capital Adequacy Ratio. 
b) Equity to total asset ratio. 
2. Credit Risk: 
a) NPLtoGRi,t 
b) LLRtoGRi,t 
a) Non-Performing Loans to Gross Loans 
b) Loan Loss Reserves to  Gross Loans 
3. Liquidity Risk: 
a) LAtoTDi,t 
b) NLtoTAi,t 
a) Liquid Assets to Total deposits and borrowings 
b) Net loans to Total Assets 
SECi,t Asset securitization activity measured as the total securitization for bank i at time t 
issuance deflated by total assets at time t. 
IBsi Dummy variable equal 1 for Islamic banks and 0 for Conventional banks. 
REGL_Rj The ratio of Muslim population in country j to the total population of  the country. 
FINANi,t A ratio of all shareholders classified by either ORBIS or Zawya as financial institutions, 
mutual funds, Insurance companies; Banks etc. 
CORi,t A ratio includes all firms that are not part of financial institutions or private owners. 
FAMILYi,t A ratio of individual shareholders or their families. Also in this category fall privately 
owned firms, in other words firms that are wholly owned by ether a single private 
investor or a group of private investors. 
GOVi,t  
FORi,t  
Sizei,t Natural logarithm of the total bank assets for bank i at time t. 
AGEi,t Age of bank i at time t since the year of its establishment 
NON_INTi,t Total Non-Interest Operating Income scaled by Total Assets for bank i at time t 
Crisist Time Dummy equal 1 for the financial periods of 2007-2009 and 0 otherwise. 
MACROi,j,t A set of country level macroeconomic variables for bank i in country j at time t, 
MSDi,t Bank i deposits at time t over total banking sector deposits at time t 
ROLi,t Captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence 
RQi,t Captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development 
GDPGRi,t Growth in GDP per capita in country j at time t 
INFi,t Country-prevailing inflation rate for bank i in time t. 
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics  
  Observations Panel A: Descriptive Statistics (Full Sample) Panel B: Mean Comparison  Panel C: Median Comparison 
  Variables: 
Full 
Sample 
Islamic 
Conventi
onal 
Mean Median 
St. 
Dev. 
Minimum Maximum Islamic 
Convention
al 
T-test (P-
Value) 
Islamic 
Conventi
onal 
MW Z-
test (P-
Value) 
CAR(%)       22.155    16.96 19.550     26.470     22.961       16.31 16.91   
NPLtoGR(%)       8.083     3.885 12.504     10.681     9.947       2.13 4.39   
LLRtoGR(%)       7.140   3.419 11.528     8.513     7.809      2.675 3.311   
NLtoTA(%)       45.334    47.143 22.048     50.543    42.642       59.428 41.635   
LAtoTD(%)       41.310      31.232 47.168     46.214    44.002       27.407 37.256   
Size (%)       7.484    7.400 2.053     8.360     7.473      8.370 7.148   
NON_IN(%)       0.030   0.012 0.457     0.017     0.036      0.010 0.011   
AGE       36.821  27 43.051     17.536     49.235        12 31   
MSD       0.048    0.012 0.091     0.034    0.049       0.013 0.008   
ROL       55.190     57.895 26.242     61.368     60.102       62.856 57.895   
RQ       57.921     56.796 26.246     64.242    62.726      69.268 59.314   
GDPGR       8.319     7.845 11.028        8.265     9.142       7.990 8.509   
INF       5.533    4.484 4.816     4.887     5.011       3.2 3.613   
Notes: Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the test variables for the period of 2003-2012. The study pooled sample reflects banks operating in 22 crosscountries with 4889 bank-year 
observations (672 banks).   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Impact of Securitization on Capitalization, Credit and Liquidity Risks- Baseline 
Estimation 
                -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 
                  CAR      NPLtoGR      LLRtoGR       LAtoTD       NLtoTA   
CARt-1                                                     0.378**           
                                                     (0.000)                   
L.EtoTA 
          
          
NPLtoGRt-1                                            
 
 0.535**              
                                                            
 
 (0.000)         
LLRtoGR t-1                                             
 
 0.843**          
                                                           
 
  (0.000)        
LAtoTDt-1                                                   
 
 0.395**      
                                                                
 
(0.000)     
NLtoTAt-1                                                       
 
  0.638** 
                                                                
 
  (0.000)   
SEC            -0.114**    -0.0671      -0.0194       1.501        0.176** 
              (0.000)      (0.680)      (0.331)      (0.664)      (0.000)   
ROL            0.0831        0.133        0.207*       0.519      -0.00330   
              (0.332)      (0.239)      (0.021)      (0.298)      (0.997)   
RQ           -0.114      -0.0946      0.00795        0.945+      0.0841   
              (0.155)      (0.243)      (0.826)      (0.055)      (0.268)   
Size           -4.460*      -2.674*      -1.982       -17.64       -0.164   
              (0.003)      (0.046)      (0.152)      (0.253)      (0.889)   
GDPGR        -0.00599      -0.0358+     -0.0373*      0.0502       0.0196   
              (0.692)      (0.057)      (0.002)      (0.487)      (0.340)   
MSD            -15.85       -17.95       -43.40*      -84.62       -23.71   
              (0.299)      (0.110)      (0.018)      (0.332)      (0.181)   
NON_IN         79.63*      -4.720       -25.94       -181.1        5.377   
              (0.012)      (0.907)      (0.192)      (0.482)      (0.891)   
AGE            0.0379        0.234+     0.00120        1.395       0.0102   
              (0.774)      (0.087)      (0.995)      (0.542)      (0.927)   
INF            -0.198**      0.101      -0.0157       -0.402        0.131   
              (0.000)      (0.251)      (0.686)      (0.186)      (0.130)   
EtoTA                       -0.0462      -0.0918        2.559*      -0.174+  
                            (0.785)      (0.362)      (0.029)      (0.081)   
Cons           50.68**      16.24+       9.095        0.314        16.14+  
              (0.000)      (0.077)      (0.382)      (0.995)      (0.070)   
Wald Test     122.2        136.7        422.6        527.8        150.7   
Sargan Test   24.51        62.29        38.80        45.91        35.12      
             (0.30)        (0.23)       (0.49)      (0.16)       (0.64) 
Auto- correlation       0.53         0.13         0.58         0.67           0.47 
  (0.60)       (0.78)       (0.72)       (0.50)         (0.64) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Impact of Securitization on Capitalization, Credit and Liquidity Risks during Crisis (2008-09) 
                -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 
                 CAR EtoTA NPLtoGR 
LLRtoG
R 
LAtoTD NLtoTA 
CARt-1                                                     0.373**             
                                                     (0.000) 
     
L.EtoTA  
 0.336** 
    
 
(0.000) 
    
NPLtoGRt-1                                            
  
 0.533** 
  
                                                              
  
(0.000) 
  
LLRtoGR t-1                                              
   
 0.845** 
  
                                                           
   
(0.000) 
  
LAtoTDt-1                                                  
    
 0.400** 
 
                                                              
    
(0.000) 
 
NLtoTAt-1                                                    
     
 0.627** 
                                                            
     
(0.000) 
SEC_C 
-0.107* -0.0511 -0.492 -0.0164 -0.402 -0.289** 
(0.043) (0.996) (0.499) (0.142) (0.679) (0.000) 
ROL          0.0844  0.0240  0.130  0.207*  0.443 -0.00991 
          (0.325) (0.709) (0.239) (0.022) (0.401) (0.905) 
RQ      -0.118  0.00840 -0.0918  0.00887  0.974*  0.103 
             (0.140) (0.861) (0.255) (0.806) (0.045) (0.175) 
Size      -4.470* -5.516** -2.639+ -1.985 -17.72 -0.0837 
             (0.003) (0.000) (0.051) (0.157) (0.241) (0.943) 
GDPGR     -0.00729 0.000734 -0.0353+ -0.0373*  0.0373  0.0143 
            (0.626) (0.945) (0.063) (0.003) (0.606) (0.491) 
MSD       -15.04 -33.59** -18.30 -43.38* -79.75 -27.85 
              (0.328) (0.000) (0.102) (0.018) (0.393) (0.129) 
SNON_IN     80.82* 59.39* -4.443 -24.90 -196.8  4.542 
             (0.011) (0.039) (0.912) (0.217) (0.467) (0.907) 
AGE       0.0336  0.333+  0.230+  0.00103  1.338 -0.0247 
            (0.799) (0.055) (0.093) (0.996) (0.565) (0.827) 
INF          -0.188** -0.0645+  0.0958 -0.0120 -0.402  0.141 
           (0.001) (0.065) (0.270) (0.756) (0.188) (0.100) 
EtoTA                   
  
-0.0455 -0.0958  2.579* -0.164 
                         (0.789) (0.342) (0.028) (0.101) 
Cons           51.05**  40.60**  16.11+  9.091  5.685  16.87+ 
            (0.000) (0.000) (0.084)      (0.391) (0.907) (0.064) 
Wald Test    127.7                      136.2 137.5 462.6        519.3        111.6   
Sargan Test   
                
      Auto- correlation 
        
       
       
       
 
 
 
Table 6: SEC activity controlling for Bank Type for the period (2003-2012) 
Panel A: Main Result 
                 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 
                 
 CAR        EtoTA      NPLtoGR  
    
LLRtoGR       LAtoTD 
      
NLtoTA   
L.CAR                      0.379**                                                 
                                                (0.000)                                
L.EtoTA                                   
 
 0.342**                           
                                                           
 
  (0.000)                       
L.NPLtoGR                                
 
 0.530**             
                                                                
 
 (0.000)                  
L.LLRtoGR                                                              
 
0.761**           
                                                                           
 
 (0.000)       
L.LAtoTD                                                                   0.375**       
                                                                             (0.000)        
L.NLtoTA                                                                          0.640** 
                                                                                  (0.000)   
SEC           
 -0.115**    0.00114       -0.266 
     -
0.0242        1.936        0.175** 
              (0.000)      (0.977)      (0.292)      (0.277)      (0.571)      (0.000)   
IB             -0.823       22.96        9.31       19.81*        29.37*        1.082   
              (0.958)      (0.144)      (0.713)      (0.037)      (0.013)      (0.878)   
ROL            0.0785       0.0309        0.220*       0.131        0.407     -0.00701   
              (0.323)      (0.688)      (0.037)      (0.103)      (0.362)      (0.938)   
RQ             -0.117       0.0172       -0.118     -0.00151        0.951+      0.0820   
              (0.140)      (0.753)      (0.165)      (0.961)      (0.054)      (0.298)   
LnTA          
 -4.413*   
   -
6.288**     -4.758*      -2.529*      -13.69       -0.183   
              (0.007)      (0.000)      (0.004)      (0.050)      (0.354)      (0.876)   
GDPGR        -0.00757      0.00621      -0.0371+     -0.0308*      0.0551       0.0205   
              (0.596)      (0.572)      (0.053)      (0.005)      (0.446)      (0.320)   
MSD            -15.75       -25.73*   -32.48*      -34.53*     -69.36       -24.91   
              (0.298)      (0.002)      (0.025)      (0.041)      (0.369)      (0.156)   
SNON_IN         80.44*       60.11*      -19.26    -21.97     -152.5        4.900   
              (0.011)      (0.041)      (0.642)      (0.251)      (0.559)      (0.901)   
AGE            0.0250        0.595*       0.279       0.0681        0.765       0.0127   
              (0.899)      (0.001)      (0.104)      (0.701)      (0.721)      (0.909)   
INF            -0.189**    -0.0557        0.114      -0.0308       -0.442        0.125   
              (0.000)      (0.122)      (0.189)      (0.374)      (0.154)      (0.143)   
EtoTA                                    -0.0516       -0.123        2.561*      -0.174+ 
                                          (0.754)      (0.207)      (0.025)      (0.085) 
_cons           51.24**      31.57*       25.36*       13.14        12.04        16.49+  
              (0.000)      (0.001)      (0.010)      (0.168)      (0.775)      (0.067)   
chi2            123.3        105.7        168.9        353.5        473.7        138.9   
Panel B: Marginal Results for Muslim Majority countries 
SEC  0.487                   -0.254    -0.270+   -0.492     -0.346   
   (0.400)        (0.334)      (0.061)      (0.717)      (0.292)   
IB 12.10        12.37        45.34*      66.52      -13.64+ 
   (0.425)        (0.432)       (0.007)       (0.260)      (0.067) 
Cons 50.50**       43.09**      16.96+       37.89    17.88* 
   (0.000)        (0.001)      (0.087)       (0.324)      (0.048)    
Wald test 58.83        224.2      227.4      114.6      87.41   
Panel C: Marginal Results for Non-Muslim Majority countries 
SEC -0.139**                   1.060     -0.00856    -0.310   0.185*  
   (0.000)        (0.817)       (0.442)      (0.951)      (0.002)    
IB -6.878                   15.49       12.98    -58.15     11.05   
    (0.451)        (0.523)      (0.379)      (0.424)      (0.465) 
Cons 47.00**        8.848  25.54+    -388.9   41.71* 
  (0.000)        (0.655)      (0.071)      (0.300)      (0.040)   
Wald test 291.7          134.3        219.8        780.8        75.93   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: SEC activity controlling for Religiocity for the period (2003-2012) 
  -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 
 
CAR EtoTA NPLtoGR LLRtoGR LAtoTD NLtoTA 
L.CAR  0.381** 
     
 
(0.000) 
     
L.EtoTA 
 
 0.336**                                                                                                             
    
 
 
  (0.000)      
    
L.NPLtoGR 
  
 0.533**     
   
 
  
 (0.000) 
   
L.LLRtoGR 
   
 0.845**                                                                    
  
    
 (0.000) 
  
L.LAtoTD 
    
0.400**                                                                   
 
 
    
  (0.000) 
 
L.NLtoTA 
  
   
 0.627**  
   
(0.000)   
SEC_C -0.107** -0.0461 -0.255   -0.0251   1.689   0.179** 
 
(0.000)      (0.911)      (0.297)      (0.273)      (0.621)      (0.000)                        
REGL_R 16.77             
(0.166)      
-12.15     0.884    -10.35     -29.3*  32.80* 
 
(0.225)      (0.930)      (0.272)      (0.019)      (0.009)                 
IB -0.913              
(0.956)      
27.51+ 15.35*  29.25* -102.0   5.277  
 
(0.093)      (0.180)      (0.016)      (0.342)      (0.505)              
ROL  0.0810 -0.0148    0.222*    0.110     0.0156   0.0589   
 
(0.320)      (0.859)      (0.036)      (0.143)      (0.974)                   (0.497) 
RQ -0.0677                  
(0.393)      
-0.0183  
(0.718)      
-0.114   -0.0194    0.223     0.134+ 
 
(0.143)      (0.524)      (0.337)                       (0.088) 
LnTA -4.248*              
(0.006)      
-6.223**   -4.795* -2.210+  -17.36    0.000900 
 
(0.000)      (0.004)      (0.085)      (0.286)      (0.999)                  
GDPGR -0.00440            
(0.756)      
 0.0118   -0.0381*  -0.0304*   0.0951    0.0150 
 
(0.253)      (0.042)      (0.004)      (0.216)      (0.426)                 
MSD -23.98                   
(0.107)      
-22.17*   -32.71*  -30.39+   54.18    -32.31+ 
 
(0.002)      (0.009)      (0.073)      (0.338)      (0.092)                 
SNON_IN 77.24*                 
(0.014)      
64.81*     -19.57   -23.09   -148.8     4.077   
 
(0.024)      (0.634)      (0.224)      (0.519)      (0.912)                
AGE  0.0336                    
(0.799)                     
0.333+  0.230+     0.00103 
(0.996)  
 1.338 
(0.565)   
-0.0247  
 
(0.055)      (0.093) (0.827) 
INF -0.188**                                        
(0.001)                          
-0.0645+  0.0958 -0.0120 -0.402  0.141 
 
(0.065) (0.270) (0.756) (0.188) (0.100) 
EtoTA 
  
-0.0455                                                
(0.789)      
-0.0958  2.579*   
(0.028)        
-0.164 
   
(0.342)      (0.101) 
Cons 51.05**                40.60** 16.11+  9.091  5.685    16.87+ 
 
 (0.000)      (0.000)      (0.084)      (0.391)      (0.907)               (0.064) 
Wald test 127.7        136.2        137.5        462.6        519.3        111.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8a: Control for Ownership  
Panel A: Financial Institutions Ownership Panel B: Corporate  Ownership 
   -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 
  CAR EtoTA NPLtoGR LLRtoGR LAtoTD NLtoTA CAR EtoTA NPLtoGR LLRtoGR LAtoTD NLtoTA 
L.CAR 
 
0.326**                                                             
          
 
0.325**    
          
  (0.000)                                                                     (0.000)                                                                     
L.EtoTA    0.385**                                                                                    
  
  
 
0.386**                                                             
        
     (0.000)                             (0.000)         
L.NPLtoGR      0.443**                                                                                                      0.438**                                                                                              
      (0.000)                     (0.000)                   
L.LLRtoGR        0.846**                                                                                0.842**                                                                         
         (0.000)                                (0.000)                     
L.LAtoTD          0.250                                                                           0.245                                                                             
           (0.128)                          (0.155)            
L.NLtoTA            0.658**                                                                        0.660**                                                                      
             (0.000)               (0.000)   
SEC 
-
0.113**                 
 0.0188       -0.480*     -0.0119         1.011     0.171** 
-
0.113**     
 0.0189       -0.359      -0.0119     0.854  0.173** 
   (0.000)      (0.397)      (0.040)      (0.286)       (0.199)      (0.000)   (0.000)      (0.396)      (0.145)       (0.287)      (0.250)      (0.000)    
FINANL -0.534         0.447         1.953    0.416   -11.24  0.994               
  (0.721)      (0.759)      (0.144)      (0.672)      (0.145)      (0.527)               
COR             -1.555                   1.259      -3.208    -1.763+  1.211      -0.841  
              (0.568)      (0.503)       (0.218)      (0.097)       (0.849)    (0.815)    
IB -1.949        1.363        13.06* 24.39*  22.64*      2.724   -1.580         1.383        10.86*      24.63*       22.84*  2.199  
  (0.888)      (0.916)      (0.352)      (0.010)       (0.022)      (0.691)    (0.909)      (0.915)      (0.333)      (0.009)      (0.023)         (0.744) 
ROL 0.0857  0.0383    0.132    0.0975     0.0986       -0.0690   0.0841                 0.0400       0.125       0.0960   0.109      -0.0661 
  (0.282)      (0.548)      (0.183)      (0.172)      (0.813)       (0.546)    (0.292)      (0.529)       (0.212)       (0.182)      (0.787)       (0.564)    
RQ -0.0682       0.0495   -0.0714     0.0154   0.597+   0.0944   -0.0660       0.0498    -0.0559 0.0196    0.579+  0.0969 
  (0.430)       (0.315)      (0.350)      (0.684)      (0.061)      (0.300)     (0.430)       (0.309)      (0.452)      (0.610)      (0.070)      (0.291)       
LnTA -5.569*                  -3.952**    -5.518**    -1.768+     -4.396    -0.580 -5.625*                  
-
3.945**     
-5.625**   -1.841+   -5.141    -0.546   
  (0.010)      (0.001)      (0.001)      (0.073)      (0.244)      (0.636)    (0.009)      (0.001)      (0.001)      (0.057)      (0.198)      (0.661) 
GDPGR -0.0106                  -0.00602  -0.0522*  -0.0427*   -0.00219  0.0214   
-
0.00955                     
-
0.00680    
-0.0534*  -0.0426*  0.00565     0.0204  
  (0.477)      (0.544)      (0.006)      (0.001)      (0.958)      (0.333)      (0.524)  (0.517)      (0.006)      (0.001)       (0.888)         (0.354)  
MSD  4.163                   -21.51*   -44.87*    -27.94*   9.640   -0.266  4.558                  -21.70*      -46.07*      -28.35+  23.26   -0.763   
  (0.795)       (0.010)      (0.011)      (0.046)      (0.736)       (0.989)  (0.780)      (0.010)      (0.010)       (0.050)      (0.417)        (0.968) 
SNON_IN 71.58*       97.66*     -6.768  1.758 60.02 -42.36   71.09*                    97.71*      -7.654   1.229  71.49      -43.48   
  (0.003)       (0.001)      (0.855)      (0.923)      (0.753)      (0.156)     (0.003)      (0.001)      (0.839)      (0.946)       (0.721)      (0.155)    
AGE 0.133        0.277+      0.248     0.0363 -0.635      0.0499   0.140                    0.280+        0.289        0.0510 -0.609   0.0501   
  (0.570)      (0.091)      (0.200)      (0.816)      (0.388)       (0.640)  (0.552)      (0.083)      (0.127)      (0.734)      (0.412)      (0.639) 
INF 
-
0.168**                
-0.0659*     0.163*    0.00801    0.0758   0.110   
-
0.168**                
-
0.0655*  
 0.166*  0.00848     0.0530   0.113 
   (0.001)       (0.050)      (0.049)      (0.843)      (0.717)      (0.286)  (0.001)       (0.047)      (0.045)      (0.833)      (0.793)      (0.272)   
EtoTA     -0.222                                            -0.265*     1.445*   -0.143       -0.220                                           -0.267*   1.442* -0.143   
      (0.153)      (0.008)      (0.030)      (0.215)      (0.149)       (0.006)      (0.035)         (0.212) 
Cons 54.34**      25.07*       38.59**    8.519   27.20     19.18* 54.29**      24.92*       38.53**    8.748        25.96  19.13* 
  (0.000)      (0.001)      (0.000)      (0.163)      (0.606)      (0.048) (0.000)      (0.001)      (0.001)      (0.152)      (0.625)        (0.049) 
Wald test 159.7        76.45        105.1        234.9        86.14        147.6   148.1        81.82        83.90        212.1        83.34        150.2 
 
 
            
 
 
Table 8b: Control for Ownership 
Panel A: Private Ownership Panel B: Foreign Ownership 
   -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6 -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 
  CAR EtoTA 
NPLtoG
R 
LLRtoG
R 
LAtoTD NLtoTA CAR NPLtoGR LLRtoGR LAtoTD NLtoTA 
L.CAR  0.328**                                                                   0.325**                                                                                     
  (0.000)           (0.000)                          
L.EtoTA    0.387**                                                                                                                    
    (0.000)                                 
L.NPLtoGR      0.440**                                            0.441**                                                     
      (0.000)                                               (0.000)       
L.LLRtoGR        0.845**                                     0.846**                                                               
         (0.000)                                (0.000)                 
L.LAtoTD          0.244                                                                    0.260                                                     
           (0.160)                        (0.106)                 
L.NLtoTA           0.659**                                                                0.660**                                                    
            (0.000)          (0.000)   
SEC -0.111**      0.0190      -0.367   -0.0117     0.856   0.171** -0.114**                 -0.394   -0.0118          1.215     0.171** 
  (0.000)       (0.392)      (0.142)        (0.293)      (0.251)      (0.000)       (0.000)        (0.157)      (0.288)       (0.163)      (0.000)   
PRIV -1.840*                   -1.042       -2.392     -1.169  -0.743   -1.609             
   (0.008)      (0.297)       (0.101)       (0.275)      (0.882)      (0.349)           
FOREIGN             -1.024        0.211   -0.0228     -21.79+    2.698   
               (0.477)      (0.897)      (0.981)      (0.064)      (0.189)     
IB -1.332                     0.955        10.02       24.19*   22.25*   2.235   -2.298       0.597     24.44*      22.71*   4.210   
   (0.922)      (0.941)      (0.154)       (0.011)      (0.023)          (0.741)  (0.869)        (0.424)      (0.009)       (0.024)      (0.546)     
ROL  0.0839       0.0357      0.144        0.0979   0.104  -0.0679  0.0805        0.134        0.0992      0.0229      -0.0756 
   (0.287)       (0.578)      (0.149)      (0.172)      (0.797)      (0.556)     (0.320)      (0.188)      (0.171)      (0.957)      (0.511)      
RQ -0.0692          0.0509  -0.0626    0.0151     0.584+     0.0974  -0.0658                   -0.0642   0.0166    0.644+   0.0875   
   (0.416)   (0.295)      (0.410)        (0.693)      (0.066)       (0.285)      (0.440)      (0.397)      (0.662)      (0.055)      (0.346)             
LnTA -5.551*                  -3.948**     -5.476**  -1.758+ -5.165     -0.590  -5.574*              -5.586**  -1.801+  -3.853 -0.583   
   (0.010)      (0.001)      (0.001)      (0.069)       (0.191)       (0.633)      (0.010)      (0.001)      (0.064)      (0.316)      (0.634)             
GDPGR -0.00873                 -0.00641   -0.0513*  -0.0426*  0.00590 0.0210   -0.0106     -0.0537*  -0.0429* -0.00616  0.0228  
   (0.556)        (0.539)      (0.006)      (0.001)      (0.883)      (0.341)        (0.487)      (0.006)      (0.001)      (0.885)      (0.304)            
MSD 3.751                  -21.86*   -46.35*  -28.05* 22.89  -0.707   4.300                   -46.51*   -28.42*  3.584   -1.938   
   (0.822)      (0.012)       (0.005)      (0.047)      (0.431)      (0.971)           (0.792)      (0.010)      (0.046)      (0.910)      (0.918)               
SNON_IN 72.50*       97.56* -3.906        1.741      70.59  -42.51  71.10*                  -6.597  1.607  40.51 -40.45   
  (0.003)      (0.001)      (0.917)      (0.924)      (0.725)       (0.164)       (0.004)      (0.859)      (0.929)      (0.825)      (0.167)                   
AGE  0.130         0.274+     0.248      0.0299  -0.613       0.0481   0.131        0.284        0.0472     -0.762  0.0486   
  (0.581)      (0.093)       (0.179)      (0.843)      (0.428)      (0.653)    (0.579)      (0.132)      (0.755)      (0.321)      (0.644)           
INF -0.166**  -0.0636+    0.166*    0.00924   0.0557    0.114   -0.169**       0.167*      0.00885    0.0309  0.112   
   (0.001)   (0.052)      (0.047)       (0.819)       (0.786)      (0.268)      (0.001)      (0.045)      (0.826)      (0.870)      (0.283)             
EtoTA     -0.219                                           -0.265* 1.444*    -0.145    -0.220                                    -0.266*   1.471* -0.145  
       (0.154)        (0.007)      (0.035)       (0.205)      (0.151) (0.007)      (0.028)      (0.200)         
Cons 54.28**  25.59*  38.29**   9.029  26.53    19.83* 54.78**     38.12**  8.458     33.52      19.18* 
   (0.000)  (0.001)      (0.000)      (0.142)      (0.628)      (0.044)          (0.000)      (0.001)      (0.169)      (0.533)      (0.047)            
Wald test 157.6        75.70        84.48        210.8        81.19        149.8   149.4        84.24        221.5        79.06        144.4   
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9: Marginal Results (block ownership and Securitization) 
Panel A: Block Ownership of Financial Institutions 
   
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 
CAR NPLtoGR LLRtoGR LAtoTD NLtoTA 
SEC  0.0769*      -1.784+      0.00760  0.456  0.179** 
  (0.028)      (0.060)      (0.712)      (0.424)      (0.000)                 
IB  5.828         9.943  12.31  -35.02 -2.725   
  (0.687)      (0.177)      (0.230)      (0.159)      (0.775)                    
Cons 61.17**  
31.58*   
 
11.66+ 23.92  20.14+   
  (0.000)      (0.003)      (0.058)              (0.174)      (0.100)      
N 1084 929 1132 977 1282 
Wald test 373.6        158.8        159.3        159.0        118.3   
Panel B: block owners of corporations  
SEC  0.132**                 35.36   -0.0124 -0.0376     0.0309  
    (0.000)      (0.116)      (0.228)      (0.828)      (0.453)         
IB (-12.86*      3.359    3.719   -0.890   -3.549   
     (0.002)      (0.736)      (0.178)      (0.966)      (0.803)             
Cons 32.40*      15.86*  11.25+     51.37  7.258   
   (0.002)      (0.018)      (0.078)      (0.236)      (0.734)              
N 74 58 67 61 71 
Wald test 3779.1       5243.1       1973.0      11019.4       1881.7   
Panel C: block owners of private 
SEC 15.3*     17.00        1.504      
-9.105   (0.859)      
18.61 
    (0.008)      (0.493)      (0.888)      (0.624)      
IB -2.305        18.84 11.07* -41.74 -11.97+ 
  (0.583)      (0.152)      (0.022)      (0.249)      (0.081)                 
Cons 26.01+       33.16+     16.46* 36.09 -36.71   
  (0.093)      (0.100)      (0.009)      (0.451)      (0.248)               
N 125 122 127 96 134 
Wald test 1217.9        140.7        215.9        59.15        72.74 
Panel D: block owners of government 
SEC -0.141*                -0.247    -0.0265      0.996    0.164** 
     (0.008)      (0.322)      (0.226)      (0.774)      (0.000)             
IB -4.675      31.00*     29.32* 123.2  -0.315  
    (0.763)      (0.017)      (0.014)      (0.489)      (0.964)               
Cons 50.16**    21.56*    12.54   -26.13  16.10+ 
    (0.000)      (0.017)      (0.135)      (0.645)      (0.076)              
Wald test 116.4        166.4        347.9        692.1        145.8 
Panel E: Block Owners of foreign 
SEC  1.050                  -0.914    -0.742  4.444  0.108   
    (0.113)      (0.472)      (0.252)      (0.433)      (0.737)                  
IB -9.249                   -2.269        4.678    -211.0     
(0.279)      
-13.90   
   (0.610)      (0.859)      (0.801)      (0.441)        
Cons 77.99*       10.04      31.93+  -298.4  23.51+ 
  (0.007)      (0.505)      (0.057)      (0.322)      (0.096)            
N 603 529 722 614 905 
Wald test 73.85        50.76        368.9        200.7        80.28 
 
